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This article will assess the case for reforming the Irish law on adverse possession to confer
additional protection on the owner. Assuming such reform is warranted, it is possible that
an existing judicial solution, known as the rule in Leigh v Jack, has already been devised.
Ontario’s experience with an equivalent rule, known as the inconsistent use test, is of
interest in this context and certain academic literature is discussed which explains why the
inconsistent use test was developed and argues in favour of its retention or resurrection. An
alternative model of protection is then analyzed: the English Qualified Veto System of adverse
possession introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002. I argue that a judicial or legislative
reincarnation of the rule in Leigh v Jack would be an extremely flawed method of reforming
the law in jurisdictions, such as Ireland, which are considering reform, as the Qualified Veto
System more effectively responds to the difficulties which the inconsistent use test appears
to be attempting to resolve. I conclude that such a Qualified Veto System, similar, although
not identical to the one introduced in England, should be introduced in Ireland.
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THE INCONSISTENT USE TEST or, its English ancestor, the rule in Leigh v Jack,1

has been the target of much judicial and academic criticism since its inception.2
Although the English House of Lords has defnitively rejected the rule in Leigh
v Jack—Lord Browne-Wilkinson referring to it as “heretical and wrong”3—its
status elsewhere remains less certain. For example, whether the rule still forms

1.
2.

3.

(1879), 5 Ex D 264 [Leigh v Jack].
For criticism of the inconsistent use test, see Teis v Ancaster (Town), 1997 ONCA 1688 at
para 24 [Teis]; Bradford Investments (1963) Ltd v Fama (2005), 77 OR (3d) 127 at para
100 (Ont Sup Ct) [Bradford]; Brian Bucknall, “Two Roads Diverged: Recent Decisions
on Possessory Title” (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ 375. For criticism of the rule in Leigh
v Jack, see Seamus Durack Manufacturing Ltd v Considine, [1987] IR 677 (Ir) [Seamus
Durack]; Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran, [1989] EWCA Civ 11; JA Pye (Oxford)
Ltd v Graham, [2002] UKHL 30 [JA Pye 2002]; Martin Dockray, “Adverse Possession
and Intention-II” (1982) Te Conveyancer 345 at 346-47; Adam Cloherty & David
Fox, “Heresies and Human Rights” (2005) 64 Cambridge LJ 558. Te Irish Law Reform
Commission has twice recommended the introduction of statutory clarifcation that it does
not apply. See Ireland, Te Law Reform Commission, Report on Land Law and Conveyancing
Law: General Proposals, LRC 30-1989 (Te Law Reform Commission, 1989) at paras 52-53;
Ireland, Te Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Reform and Modernisation
of Land Law and Conveyancing Law, LRC CP 34-2004 (Law Reform Commission,
2004) at para 2.04.
JA Pye 2002, supra note 2.
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part of Irish law is a matter of debate.4 Moreover, the inconsistent use test has
enjoyed an unparalleled revival in certain parts of Canada, particularly in Ontario,
leading one commentator to describe it as a functional substitute for the civil law
concept of interversion.5
Te rule in Leigh v Jack is named after an English Court of Appeal decision
delivered in 1879 and is attributed to Lord Justice Bramwell who declared:6
in order to defeat a title by dispossessing the former owner, acts must be done
which are inconsistent with his enjoyment of the soil for the purposes for which he
intended to use it: that is not the case here, where the intention of the plaintif and
her predecessors in title was not either to build upon or to cultivate the land, but to
devote it at some future time to public purposes.

While the rule held sway in England and Wales,7 it was applicable if the owner
had a plan to use the land for some specifc purpose in the future and, in the
meantime, some other person took physical possession of it.8 Te rule prevented
adverse possession from taking place if the adverse possessor’s current use was
not inconsistent with the owner’s future plan for the property. In contrast, the
inconsistent use test appears to play a more important role in adverse possession
claims. Te courts apply it in a more universal fashion, for example, if the owner
has an existing, although limited purpose (as opposed to a future plan) for the
land.9 In such circumstances, its current use must be inconsistent with the
owner’s existing purpose for the land to qualify as adverse possession. It could be
argued that this extension of the inconsistent use requirement is facilitated by a
literal reading of Lord Justice Bramwell’s original dictum in Leigh v Jack which
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Tere are conficting High Court decisions. See Cork Corporation v Lynch, [1995] 2 ILRM
598 (Ir); Seamus Durack, supra note 2. Buckley argues that the rule in Leigh v Jack continues
to play a role in Irish law. See Niall Buckley, “Adverse Possession at the Crossroads” (2006)
11 Conveyancing & Prop LJ 3 at 59, 64. In contrast, Woods argues that it cannot be
confdently asserted that the rule forms part of Irish law. See Una Woods, “Te Position
of the Owner under the Irish Law on Adverse Possession” (2008) 30 Dublin U LJ 298 at
317-22 [Woods 2008].
See Michael H Lubetsky, “Adding Epicycles: Te Inconsistent Use Test in Adverse Possession
Law” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 497 at 525-27.
Leigh v Jack, supra note 1 at 273.
For a description of the evolution of the rule in England and Wales, see Woods 2008, supra
note 4 at 314-17.
See the explanation of the case law (following Leigh v Jack put forward by Sir John
Pennycuick) in Treloar v Nute. See Treloar v Nute, [1976] 1 WLR 1295 at 1300-01 [Treloar].
Katz comments: “Te inconsistent user test is typically applied in resolving a contest
between a deliberate squatter and an owner-occupier.” See Larissa Katz, “Te Moral
Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law” (2010) 55
McGill LJ 47 at 68.
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requires, “acts to be done which are inconsistent with his enjoyment of the soil
for the purposes for which he intended to use it.”10 It is worth noting however
that, in England, a similar interpretation of the rule, known as “the doctrine of
necessary inconvenience,” made only a brief appearance in the case law before
it was rejected.11
A persistent, although sporadic theme which has emerged in law reform
and judicial circles across the common law world in recent decades has been
the fairness of the doctrine of adverse possession. A principal concern relates
to the doctrine’s failure to confer adequate protection on owners against the
danger of inadvertently losing title by adverse possession. In addition, critics
have emphasized the extent to which it permits squatters who know they do not
own the land (i.e., deliberate or “bad faith” squatters) to acquire title.12 Te Irish
law on adverse possession has not escaped this controversy. Te Law Reform
Commission in a report published in 2005 noted, “it appears to exact a very
severe penalty on a landowner (the loss of the land) through a mere oversight or

10. Leigh v Jack, supra note 1 at 273.
11. Dockray maintains that Justice Slade applied this approach in reaching his decision in
Powell v McFarlane, (1977) 38 P & CR 452 [Powell]. See also Dockray, supra note 2 at
349-50. However, Powell can also be explained on the basis that the intruder’s user was
equivocal and did not amount to possession in the absence of an intention to dispossess
the owner. See Stephen Jourdan & Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, 2nd ed
(Bloomsbury Professional, 2012) at para 9.88. See also Treloar, supra note 8. In Treloar
v Nute, the Appellate Court held it was not permissible to import into the defnition of
adverse possession a requirement that the owner had to be inconvenienced or otherwise
afected by that possession. It was held that Leigh v Jack, and the cases that followed, could
be distinguished as in those cases the owner had future plans for the property. In the absence
of plans for such a special purpose, time began to run from such taking of possession
irrespective of whether the plaintif sufered inconvenience from the possession.
12. Media coverage of adverse possession cases tends to be negative. See O’Hagan (Personal
Representative of Alice Dolan, deceased) v Grogan, [2012] IESC 8 (Ir). See also Tim Healy,
“Squatter wins rights to widow’s house 30 years after he broke in,” Irish Independent (17
February 2012), online: <www.independent.ie/irish-news/squatter-wins-rights-to-widowshouse-30-years-after-he-broke-in-26822629.html> [perma.cc/PSZ2-WY3Z]. Similarly,
the English adverse possession case, R (Best) v Chief Land Registrar, [2015] EWCA Civ 17,
attracted critical media commentary. See Paul Bracchi & Stephanie Condron, “How the
Squatter Who ‘Stole’ a Pensioner’s Tree-Bedroom House with the Blessing of the Law Will
Cost You £250,000,” Te Daily Mail (22 May 2016), online: <www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-3601741/Squatter-stole-pensioner-s-three-bedroom-house-blessing-law-cost-250-000.
html> [perma.cc/QK3Z-VM7L].
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mistake.”13 Part I of this article examines the argument for the introduction of
reform to Irish law on adverse possession designed specifcally to confer additional
protection on the owner against the danger of losing title through the operation
of the doctrine. Certain empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate the need
to safeguard the position of owners and hone the operation of the doctrine so
that only “deserving” adverse possessors would be in a position to rely on the
doctrine in Ireland.14
Assuming for the moment that the owner does require additional protection
under the Irish law on adverse possession, it is possible that an existing, although
ostensibly outmoded, judicial solution has already been devised. In 2006, Niall
Buckley made a case for the retention of the rule in Leigh v Jack to ensure more
robust protection for the property rights of the owner.15 It is worth considering
whether Ireland can learn from Ontario’s experience with the inconsistent use test
in this regard. Part II of this article critiques certain literature which explains why
the inconsistent use test was developed and argues in favour of its retention or
resurrection. Larissa Katz maintained that the adoption of an “inconsistent use”
model of adverse possession permits the radical transformation of squatters into
owners without collapsing into a moral paradox where the law appears to reward
the theft of land.16 Katz believes that this approach recognizes the authority of the
owner to set an agenda for the land and remain the owner without maintaining
possession, but also flls a vacancy in ownership where the owner is no longer
exercising their authority and the land has become agenda-less. Tis article
seeks to determine, from the Canadian experience, whether the application of
the inconsistent use test represents a regressive, heretical step or an inspired
judicial development.17

13. Ireland, Te Law Reform Commission, Report on Reform and Modernisation of Land Law
and Conveyancing Law, LRC 74-2005 (Te Law Reform Commission, 2005) at para 2.06
[Reform and Modernisation Report]. It also recognized the unfair operation of the doctrine
when it enables a person, who deliberately sets out to take advantage of it, to use it as a
means of obtaining ownership of someone else’s land without paying any compensation.
14. I discuss briefy this concept of the “deserving” and the “undeserving” adverse possessor in
Part III of this article. For a more detailed discussion, see Una Woods, “Te ‘Undeserving’
and the ‘Deserving’ Squatter under the Irish Law on Adverse Possession” in Bjorn Hoops &
Ernst J Marais, eds, New Perspectives on Acquisitive Prescription (Eleven International, 2019)
[Woods, “Te Undeserving and Deserving Squatter”].
15. Buckley, supra note 4 at 64.
16. Katz, supra note 9.
17. Lord Browne-Wilkinson described the notion that sufciency of possession can depend on
the intention of the true owner as “heretical and wrong.” See JA Pye 2002, supra note 2.
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Part III of the article examines an alternative reform option and discusses the
Qualifed Veto System of adverse possession introduced in England and Wales by
the Land Registration Act 2002.18 Trough the implementation of this reform, the
Law Commission purported to address both of the ethical concerns mentioned
earlier.19 Additional protection is conferred on the registered owner who may veto
an adverse possession application. However, the qualifcations to the veto system
preserve the operation of the doctrine for certain adverse possessors (e.g., a good
faith adverse possessor of boundary land) in the interest of fairness.20 I argue that
a similar, but not identical, system of adverse possession should be introduced
in Ireland, although lessons can be learned from the English experience in
implementing such reform. I conclude by arguing that a judicial or legislative
reincarnation of the rule in Leigh v Jack would be an extremely fawed method
of reforming the law in jurisdictions, such as Ireland, which are still considering
reform, particularly given the pragmatic alternative of introducing a qualifed
veto system of adverse possession.

I. THE CASE FOR ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR
VULNERABLE OWNERS UNDER IRISH LAW
A. SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY FOR THE OWNER

A number of views have been expressed by law reform bodies in Ireland, Northern
Ireland, and England and Wales on whether there is an ethical justifcation for
reforming the law on adverse possession to more efectively protect the owner.
Tese views have, in turn, been critiqued by academic commentators who have
discussed whether the “typical” owner deserves additional protection or whether
the law can, or should, accommodate such ethical concerns. In its report published
in 2005, the Irish Law Reform Commission commented, “it must be recognized
that on occasion the doctrine may operate unfairly.”21 It made particular reference
to the doubts expressed by English courts about the compatibility of the doctrine
of adverse possession with the European Convention on Human Rights.
It recommended that, in the future, a person claiming title by adverse possession
18. (UK), schedule 6 [Land Registration Act 2002].
19. United Kingdom, Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century:
A Consultative Document, Law Com No 254 (HM Land Registry, 1998) at para 10.19
[Law Com No 254].
20. Te Law Commission also claimed that these reforms were essential to ensure the
compatibility of the doctrine of adverse possession with title registration principles.
21. Reform and Modernisation Report, supra note 13 at para 2.06.
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would have to obtain a court “vesting” order, which would only be available
in specifed circumstances. Tese law reform proposals were clearly intended to
provide added protection for the owner and to streamline the operation of the
doctrine. In doing so, it would continue to apply only where necessary to restore
the marketability of abandoned land, and in certain other limited circumstances.
However, these particular proposed reforms were jettisoned in response to
critical submissions made to the government by the Law Society’s Conveyancing
Committee, mostly related to the workability of the proposed scheme.22
It could be argued that the tenor of the Irish Law Reform Commission’s
commentary, and its recommendations in this respect, represented a knee-jerk
reaction to the Pye litigation, which was, at the time, gradually winding its way
through the English courts. Te Pye case originated from an action brought by J.A.
Pye (Oxford) Ltd. to recover possession of 25 hectares of land in Berkshire from
the personal representatives of Michael Graham, who had been a neighbouring
farmer and claimed to have established adverse possession of the land. When the
House of Lords ruled in favour of the Grahams, Pye Ltd. proceeded to bring an
application against the UK government pursuant to article 34 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Te company alleged that the law on adverse
possession, through which it had lost land with development potential, violated
its right to property as guaranteed by the Convention. On 30 August 2007, the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment
in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom.23
It held by ten votes to seven that the English law on adverse possession, as set
out in the Land Registration Act 1925 and the Limitation Act 1980, did not violate
article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which
protects property rights.24 Tis application represented a high point of disquiet
in relation to the doctrine, and had implications for other contracting states.
Indeed, the Irish government made a third party submission to the European
22. Consequently, the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 (UK), emanating primarily
from the recommendations made in the 2005 Report, was enacted without the inclusion of
any reforms dealing with the law on adverse possession. For a discussion of these proposals,
see Una Woods, Te Irish Law on Adverse Possession: Te Case for a Qualifed Veto System
(PhD Tesis, Queen’s University Belfast, 2015), ch 5 [unpublished] [Woods]. Te Land and
Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 was enacted on 1 July 2009 and all of its provisions, with
the exception of section 132, came into operation on 1 December 2009. Section 132 came
into force on 28 February 2010.
23. [2008] 1 EGLR 111 [JA Pye 2008].
24. Te judgment reversed the Chamber decision delivered on 15 November 2005 which found
by four votes to three that there was a violation of the property rights guarantee.
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Court of Human Rights, which emphasised the important functions performed
by the doctrine in Ireland.25 Te Grand Chamber decision in JA Pye eliminated
doubts over the acceptability of the English law on adverse possession from a
human rights perspective and crushed any possibility that the Convention would
act as a catalyst for the reform of the Irish law on adverse possession. It could
be argued that the Grand Chamber decision also renders any anxiety in relation
to the position of the owner redundant. One could say that it nullifes the case
for the introduction of reforms to the doctrine in Ireland designed to confer
additional protection on the owner.26
In addition, it is interesting that a very diferent approach was taken in
2010 by the Northern Ireland Law Commission to the ethical issues which have
emerged in this area of law. While the Commission noted this development,
it ultimately recommended that the law on adverse possession should not be
reformed to accommodate ethical concerns.27 It also expressed the view that
it was not appropriate “at this stage” to recommend a veto system of adverse
possession of registered land for Northern Ireland.28
As mentioned, the Law Commission of England and Wales justifed the
reforms to the law on adverse possession introduced by the Land Registration
Act 2002 by explaining that the qualifed veto system, in conferring additional
protection on the registered owner and limiting the extent to which undeserving
squatters can rely on the doctrine, strikes a fairer balance between the owner
and the squatter.29 “Fairness” can be a nebulous concept which, like beauty, lies
25. JA Pye 2008, supra note 23 at paras 50-51.
26. It is worth bearing in mind that the Convention is designed to guarantee only a minimum
standard of protection, particularly in areas, such as property law, where a broad margin
of appreciation is aforded to Convention States. In addition, in a recent Irish Supreme
Court decision, Justice Lafoy commented that the doctrine of adverse possession
remains controversial and stated: “Tere would seem to be a need for a review of the
recommendations made by the Law Reform Commission in 1989, 2002, and 2005 with a
view to bringing clarity to the law in this area.” See Dunne v Iarnrd Éireann, [2016] IESC 47
at para 23 (Ir).
27. Ireland, Northern Ireland Law Commission, Supplementary Consultation Paper: Land Law,
Adverse Possession, Ground Rents, Covenants after Redemption, NILC 3 (Northern Ireland
Law Commission, 2010) at para 2.45 [Consultation Paper]; Ireland, Northern Ireland
Law Commission, Report: Land Law, NILC 8 (Te Stationery Ofce, 2010) at paras
12.6-12.7 [Report].
28. Ibid at paras 12.10-12.11. Consultation Paper, supra note 27 at para 2.56. It is interesting
to note that it did not defnitively reject this as an option but noted that it would require
a more in-depth analysis of the circumstances in which adverse possession takes place and
whether such a system could be extended to unregistered land.
29. Law Com No 254, supra note 19 at para 10.19.
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in the eye of the beholder, and it is unsurprising that the Commission’s claim
attracted some academic criticism. Fox and Cobb described the Commission’s
fairness rationale as predicated on the assumption that, under the old regime, the
owner who lost title was blameless.30 Tey strongly imply that the old adverse
possession regime achieved a fairer result by punishing the (blameworthy) owner
who neglected to monitor their property. Tey accuse the Law Commission of
“moral essentialism” in its treatment of owners in formulating the proposals for
the reforms, which were introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002.31 Teir
central focus is the matter of forgotten properties and they note as follows:32
For the Law Commission, the problem of forgotten properties was one for which
landowners were regarded as blameless. … Te clear (and contentious) moral
implication here—that landowners cannot rather than simply do not supervise their
properties efectively—reinforces the view that they should not be punished for
inadequate supervision by losing title to their land. Te LRA 2002 was specifcally
designed to protect registered proprietors from the possibility of such oversight or
inadvertence.

Tey also point out that the Law Commission’s focus is on large landowners
and assumes that all examples of oversight were not the fault of landowners, but
rather an unavoidable consequence of the ownership of huge volumes of land
spread across large areas. According to Lorna Fox and Neil Cobb, “it is arguable
that many large landowners are in a better position fnancially to manage their
property efectively and should therefore be expected to take much greater
responsibility for surveillance.”33 Tey also note, “the challenges of efective
supervision seem less acute for landowners of smaller tracts of land.”34 One of
their main arguments is that landowners who fail to monitor their land are in
breach of their duty of stewardship and, therefore, have a morally weaker claim
to the property than an urban squatter who occupies it as a home. Tey state that

30. Neil Cobb & Lorna Fox, “Living Outside the System? Te (Im)morality of Urban Squatting
after the Land Registration Act 2002” (2007) 27 LS 236 at 236, 242.
31. Ibid at 256.
32. Ibid at 243-44, 257-59. Fox and Cobb also make an interesting point that as urban squatters
(who are more concerned about the use value of the property than the acquisition of title)
are now unlikely to make an adverse possession application to the land registry, the registered
owners will not be notifed about such properties and they are likely to remain forgotten,
possibly becoming dilapidated, with no possibility of being brought back onto the market.
33. Ibid at 255.
34. Ibid.
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this duty of stewardship should include a fundamental obligation to engage in an
appropriate degree of supervision over empty land.35
In a recent article, which examines the case for the introduction of various
reforms to the Irish law on adverse possession, John Wylie reiterates the concerns
expressed by the Northern Irish Law Commission in relation to the dangers of
incorporating an ethical dimension into the doctrine, noting that it is necessary
to examine the ethical position of the owner if one begins to consider reforms
designed to prevent less ethical applications by squatters.36 Wylie continues:37
A proper ethical approach would involve weighing in the balance the respective
merits of both the dispossessed owner and the squatter in each individual case. I
have no hesitation in saying that devising a legislative scheme to achieve this which
the courts would fnd satisfactory to operate would be extremely difcult, if not
impossible.

Te fact that Wylie’s views coincide with those expressed by the Northern Ireland
Law Commission in 2010 is unsurprising as Professor Wylie was a member of the
legal team engaged for that particular law reform project.
It is axiomatic that owners who lose title through the operation of the doctrine
may evoke sympathy or a sense of righteous indignation depending on whether
they are perceived to be guilty of wrongdoing and their particular circumstances.
On one end of this spectrum of blame/innocence, there is the owner who has
completely abandoned their land and is guilty of wasting a valuable resource.
On the other end, there is the epitome of the dutiful owner: someone who is
unaware that adverse possession is taking place because the land in question can
only be used for activities which are less obvious, even with regular monitoring.38
Somewhere in between you have: (1) the owner who is unaware that they own
the land or uncertain about the position of a boundary; (2) the owner who desires
to retain the land but neglects to maintain or monitor it; and (3) the owner
35. Ibid.
36. See John Wylie, “Adverse Possession—Still an Ailing Concept?” (2017) 58 Ir Jur 1 at 12.
While Wylie argues in favour of the introduction of reforms to more technical elements of
the doctrine (e.g., the implementation of the parliamentary conveyance theory), he argues
against the introduction of more fundamental structural reforms, for example, the abolition
of the doctrine or the introduction of a qualifed veto system.
37. Ibid at 14.
38. Although legal experts appear to be divided on whether adverse possession must be
“obvious,” I concur with the opinion of the Law Commission of England and Wales on this
issue. In certain circumstances, adverse possession can take place without it being readily
detectible, despite monitoring by the owner. See Law Com No 254, supra note 19 at paras
5.46, 10.4. For further discussion, see Woods, supra note 22, ch 3, part 3.
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who is aware that someone is in possession but neglects to enter into a formal
arrangement with the occupier or take legal action to evict them.
If the owner has no current use for the property but has future plans for it,
an owner’s failure to act may seem more understandable, although a sympathetic
reaction is not a foregone conclusion as the Pye litigation aptly illustrates. Te
resigned reluctance of certain members of the judiciary at the domestic level
to rule in favour of the adverse possessor, their sympathy for the owner, and
their clear indications of dissatisfaction with the old adverse possession regime,39
contrasts sharply with the references of the European Court of Human Rights to
the culpability of the company in failing to regularize the Grahams’ occupation
of the land or issue proceedings within the twelve year limitation period. Tis
culpability was viewed by the European Court as particularly pronounced, given
that the company was engaged in specialized professional real estate development
and should be assumed to have knowledge of the law on adverse possession.40
Conway and Stannard note that the public emotional response to the Pye
litigation was fairly muted, despite the amount of land at stake and its value.
Tey speculate that reactions were probably infuenced by the fact that Pye Ltd.
was a wealthy (and faceless) corporation with an abundance of land, and in some
way responsible for what had happened by failing to remove the Grahams. Also,
development land was at stake rather than a private residence.41 However, when
the background to the case is considered in a little more depth, the culpability
of the company does not appear so clear cut. Tere was a history of grazing
agreements between the company and the Grahams, and it would clearly have
been in the fnancial interests of the company to enter into another grazing
agreement with the Grahams. Te reasons for not doing so were strategic: Tey
feared it would prejudice a planning application. Te company was aware that
the Grahams wished to use the land, and the company representative who visited
the land may well have noticed that they were continuing to do so. It is arguable
that the company had monitored the land, and its representatives were aware
and content that it was being exploited and maintained while they were seeking
planning permission. Te company’s representatives were simply guilty of not
acting in an antagonistic or litigious fashion towards a neighbouring farmer.
39. See JA Pye (Oxford) Holdings Ltd v Graham, [2000] Ch 676 at 709-10, Neuberger
J [JA Pye 2000].
40. JA Pye 2008, supra note 23. References to the culpability of the company appear in the
Chamber judgment at 68, the opinion of the dissenting judges at 1-12 and the Grand
Chamber judgment at 80.
41. See Heather Conway and John Stannard, “Te emotional paradoxes of adverse possession”
(2013) 64 N Ir Leg Q 75 at 82-84.
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B. WHAT ARE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE “TYPICAL” OWNER
AFFECTED BY THE IRISH LAW?

Although adverse possession can occur in a myriad of diferent circumstances
against owners of varying levels of culpability, it makes sense to take due
consideration of the most common situations in assessing whether owners are
blameworthy, and the case for additional protection. Is the argument made by
Fox and Cobb relevant in the Irish context? Does the doctrine currently operate
to punish “large landowners” who fail to comply with their duty of stewardship?
Is it possible to make any generalizations about the position of the owner who
loses title by adverse possession in response to Wylie’s reticence to introduce any
reforms to the Irish law in this area prompted by ethical concerns?
In Ireland, over one thousand adverse possession applications are made
(pursuant to section 49 of the Registration of Title Act) to the Property Registration
Authority in relation to registered land on an annual basis.42 Te majority of
these “section 49 applications” are successful.43 In addition, approximately
fve hundred applications for frst registration of unregistered land based on
possession, otherwise known as Form 5 applications,44 are made on an annual
basis.45 It has been informally confrmed that adverse possession applications
to the Property Registration Authority are rarely lodged against the State, local
authorities, or companies. Applications which are made against local authorities
or companies are generally uncontested and involve small plots of land.46 For
example, sometimes a small plot of land forming part of a housing estate is not
disposed of and is instead incorporated into an adjacent garden.
In 2008, the Property Registration Authority conducted an analysis of
section 49 applications received during a one-month period in respect of two
42. Tese applications are made by completing Form 6. See Land Registration Rules 2012 (IR),
SI No 483/2012. Tis level of applications appears to be quite consistent: 1,378 section 49
applications were received in 2007 and 1,081 applications were received in 2011.
43. Eight hundred and eighty-four applications were completed in 2007. Seven hundred and
seventy-eight applications were completed in 2011. Te rest were abandoned, withdrawn,
refused, or transferred.
44. Form 5 is set out in the Land Registration Rules 2012 (IR), SI No 483/2012.
45. Eight hundred and seventy-three applications were received in 2007; 767 applications were
received in 2012; 386 applications were received in 2013.
46. It may be that when such cases arise, many of them are settled before an application is
even made to the Property Registration Authority. For example, Kitty Holland discusses
the fnancial settlements negotiated between Fingal County Council and certain traveller
families living in Dunsink Lane. See Kitty Holland, “Whose Land Is It Anyway?,” Irish Times
(16 June 2007), online: <www.irishtimes.com/news/whose-land-is-it-anyway-1.1210808>
[https://perma.cc/H37L-HCDW].
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counties, Cork and Waterford.47 Te analysis revealed that over 56 per cent of
these applications involved adverse possession between family members, typically
in relation to property forming part of an unadministered estate. It was confrmed
that objections are made in the majority of section 49 applications, and that 70
per cent of the objections reviewed in this survey were based on an entitlement
to the land under the unadministered intestate or testate estate of the registered
owner. Of course, once the limitation period has expired, such an objection
has no legal basis and will not prevent registration in the absence of another
valid ground for objection. For example, proof that the objector continued to
engage in acts of possession, or that the applicant was not in possession or was in
possession pursuant to a licence would all constitute valid grounds for objection.
Where only one or some of the members of a family with entitlements under
an unadministered estate enter into, or remain in possession, of the property
following the death of the deceased owner, those out of possession are clearly in
a very precarious position as the Irish law currently stands.48 It is easy to imagine
a situation where absent members of the family were content to allow a sibling
to continue to occupy a property but failed to appreciate that their interests
were in danger of being extinguished by neglecting to formalize the arrangement.
Te fact that family members frequently object to section 49 applications
refects the counter-intuitive nature of the law on this issue. Te potential
for misunderstanding renders absent family members extremely vulnerable,
an argument that has been made to justify the English position, which precludes
adverse possession in such circumstances.49
Te internal survey conducted by the Property Registration Authority
revealed that the second most common situation, representing 25 per cent of
section 49 applications, involved lost or informal transfers. Twelve per cent of
applications involved strangers to title, frequently in relation to abandoned land.
Finally, 6 per cent of applications involved boundary issues.50 I have relied on
this secondary data (i.e., the Property Registration Authority’s internal survey) to
47. Note that this survey was restricted to registered land and did not include applications
for frst registration based on possession. I am grateful to the Property Registration
Authority for sharing this information with me, particularly CEO, Liz Pope, who patiently
discussed it with me.
48. For a discussion of the law in this area, see Una Woods, “Adverse Possession and
Unadministered Estates: An Unfair Solution to a Redundant Irish Problem” (2016) 67 N Ir
Leg Q 137 [Woods 2016].
49. Gareth Miller, “Te Administration of Estates and Adverse Possession” (2000) 150 New LJ
940 at 940, 946.
50. Note that 1% of applications involved a claim to commonage.
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conduct my analysis of adverse possession applications for pragmatic reasons.51
Although the organization’s aim coincided with my own—identifying how the
doctrine is relied on in practice—as the Authority was the primary data collector,
it decided on the survey’s scope and other aspects of how the survey was to be
conducted. While the sample of section 49 applications surveyed was small (one
month’s applications in 2008 in respect of two counties, totalling eighty-eight
cases), I was reassured that the results accurately refected the experience of
Examiners of Title who dealt with such applications on a daily basis. Te decision
to sample the counties of Cork and Waterford was justifed on the basis that they
contain a good mix of both urban and rural properties.
Although only a minority of adverse possession disputes reach the courts,
an analysis of the reported Irish case law reveals that most of these disputes
arise between family members or neighbouring landowners.52 Te number of
cases involving family members is unsurprising and refects the experience of
the Property Registration Authority in dealing with section 49 applications. Te
disputes between neighbours typically arise because one party encroaches on land
that is not being used by the owner. It seems fair to assume that the fact that these
cases reach court indicates the contentious nature of the dispute, the entrenched
position of the parties, and consequently, the discordant relationship that can
be predicted for these neighbours into the future regardless of the outcome.53
Terefore, in Ireland, owners rarely lose title through adverse possession to a
stranger unless the land has been abandoned. Most owners lose title to members
of their family and, when the dispute is litigated, a signifcant number of cases
involve neighbours.

51. For further discussion of this methodology, see Una Woods, “Te Case for a Qualifed Veto
System of Adverse Possession in Ireland: A Doctrinal Approach with ‘Bells and Whistles’”
in Laura Cahilane & Jennifer Schweppe, eds, Case Studies in Legal Research Methodologies:
Refections on Teory and Practice (Clarus Press, 2019).
52. Tere are thirty-four cases listed in the Appendix. In sixteen of these cases there was a family
relationship between the parties; fourteen cases involved neighbouring landowners; three
cases involved a pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties; only one case
involved strangers.
53. As Jefrey Evans Stake points out, the doctrine “strains neighbourhood relations and could
force us away from the most efcient use of the land.” See Jefrey Evans Stake, “Te Uneasy
Case for Adverse Possession” (2001) 89 Geo LJ 2419 at 2433. William G Ackerman &
Shane T Johnson list the “Creation of Division and Animosity Between Neighbours”
as a disadvantage or problem of adverse possession. See William G Ackerman & Shane
T Johnson, “Outlaws of the Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and Adverse
Possession” (1996) 31 Land & Water L Rev 79 at 94.
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Although it is impossible to speculate on the circumstances that give rise
to every claim, it seems reasonable to assume in this peculiarly familial or
neighbourly context, that many such owners fail to take action out of a desire
to avoid confict or because they imagine and trust that the occupier recognizes
that their presence is simply tolerated. Although such owners may be accused
of naivety or, in some cases, perhaps a degree of laxity in failing to familiarize
themselves with the law, it seems harsh to denigrate them as “blameworthy” for
failing to formalize the arrangement or commence litigation. It is submitted that
these owners are particularly vulnerable and would beneft from a system that
would warn them if they are in danger of losing title through adverse possession.54

II. THE PROTECTION AFFORDED TO OWNERS BY THE
INCONSISTENT USE TEST
Te inconsistent use test features most prominently in Ontario case law; therefore,
its status in that particular jurisdiction is the focus of this article. Te test was
incorporated into the law on adverse possession in Ontario by a trilogy of Court
of Appeal decisions delivered in the 1970s and 1980s: Keefer v Arillotta,55 Fletcher
v Storoschuk,56 and Masidon Investments Ltd v Ham.57 As was the case with the
rule in Leigh v Jack, it is not immediately obvious where the inconsistent use test
fts in the proofs that make up an adverse possession claim, as identifed in Pfug
and Pfug v Collins:58 actual possession for the statutory period, possession with
the intention of excluding the owner, and the efective exclusion of the owner’s
possession for the statutory period.59 In Keefer and Fletcher, Justice Wilson clearly
regarded the test as relevant to the establishment of animus possidendi; that is,
it was part of the second requirement set out in Pfug. She stated that the person
claiming a possessory title must have an intention to exclude the owner from
54. In the case of applications in relation to land, which had been the subject of a lost or
informal transfer or abandoned, it is clear that such owners have no need of additional
protection. It is submitted that any reforms made to the law on adverse possession should not
impede such applicants.
55. (1976), 72 DLR (3d) 182 (Ont CA) [Keefer].
56. (1981), 128 DLR (3d) 59 (Ont CA) [Fletcher].
57. (1984), 45 OR (2d) 563 (CA) [Masidon].
58. [1952] 3 DLR 681 (Ont HC) [Pfug].
59. See ibid at 689. Tis three-part test has been cited with approval in many subsequent
decisions. See e.g. Keefer, supra note 55; Teis, supra note 2. In Pfug, the third requirement
was referred to as the “discontinuance of possession” by the owner and all others, if any,
entitled to possession. However, subsequent case law has clarifed that efective exclusion
must be proved.
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such uses as the owner wants to make of their property. However, in Masidon,
Justice Blair regarded the inconsistent use test as relevant in establishing whether
the third requirement for adverse possession had been satisfed, i.e., whether the
owner had been efectively excluded from the land. As Michael Lubetsky points
out, to confuse matters further, a third line of authority treats the inconsistent use
test as part of both the animus and exclusion requirements.60
Brian Bucknall, in an article published just after the Court of Appeal for
Ontario decision was delivered in Masidon, was critical of the adoption of the
inconsistent use test which demands an inquiry into both the intention of the
owner and the intention of the possessor.61 He felt that when Justice Wilson’s
inconsistent use test gloss is put on the test for animus possidendi, it requires the
person in possession of the land to: (1) know that they do not own the land, (2)
know who does own the land, and (3) know the intentions that the owner has
with regard to the use of the lands.62 As Bucknall notes, proof of any intention is
difcult and proving this degree of knowledge and intent over a ten-year period
will obviously represent a considerable challenge. He noted that the formulation
is almost impossible to apply in the most common adverse possession scenario,
where both the owner and the possessor are mistaken about the nature and extent
of their respective rights in relation to a boundary strip and, therefore, cannot
establish an intention consistent with Justice Wilson’s legal test.
It is interesting to note that in Beaudoin v Aubin,63 an Ontario case that
involved a mutual mistake in relation to the ownership of a boundary strip, Justice
Anderson, in a decision delivered after Keefer and Fletcher but before Masidon,
made no attempt to apply the inconsistent use test. He rejected the notion that
sections 4 and 15 of the Limitations Act 1970 required a claimant to demonstrate
a subjective intention, with knowledge of the rights of the plaintif present in
his mind, to occupy in defance or denial of those rights. He distinguished
several cases where intention was found to be an important element by showing
that they focused on factual situations in which the acts of possession were
equivocal.64 After conducting a historical review of the law on adverse possession,
Justice Anderson concluded that since the abolition of “adverse possession” in its
60. See Laurier Homes (27) Ltd v Brett (2005), 42 RPR (4th) 86 (Ont Sup Ct). See also
Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 513-14.
61. See Bucknall, supra note 2.
62. Ibid at 380.
63. (1981), 125 DLR (3d) 277 (Ont HC) [Beaudoin].
64. See Re St Clair Beach Estates Ltd v MacDonald et al (1974), 5 OR (2d) 482 (Div Ct);
Sherren v Pearson (1886), 14 SCR 581; Williams Bros Direct Supply Stores Ltd v Raferty,
[1957] 3 All ER 593.
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technical sense,65 where the acts of possession are certain and unequivocal, animus
possidendi can be presumed.
Since the Court of Appeal for Ontario trilogy, the inconsistent use test has
not been applied in a consistent fashion by Ontario courts. Lubetsky succinctly
explains why:66 Te test produces counterintuitive and even outrageous results
when applied in certain situations. As Lubetsky notes, in some cases delivered
after the trilogy,67 the courts simply followed Beaudoin and made no attempt
to reconcile it with the case law that applies the test.68 However, in other cases
the judicial response was to imply an intention on the part of the owner or to
graft exceptions to the test. According to Lubetsky, the “fantastic diversity of
approaches read as a whole, represent a highly creative brainstorming exercise
among the judiciary,”69 but the diferent approaches have also made the law in
this area increasingly unclear. His detailed overview of the case law reveals that
the test tends not to be applied in cases of mutual or unilateral mistake in relation
to the ownership of the land.70 On occasion, the test also tends not to be applied
where the owner has clearly lost interest in the land and sufcient evidence of
their intentions cannot be submitted to the court.71 Tis is dubbed the “apathetic
titleholder” by Lubetsky.72
It is submitted that the difculties encountered in cases of mutual or
unilateral mistake or apathetic owners are undoubtedly a result of the treatment
of the inconsistent use test as a standard element of the adverse possession proofs
and not a special rule to govern a situation where the owner has future plans for
the property. If an owner has no plans for the property and is not engaged in any
activities as the user, because of a mistake in relation to its ownership or due to
65. Under the old law some acts of possession were deemed to be acts on behalf of the owner.
Tis approach was abolished by the enactment of An Act to Amend the Law Respecting Real
Property, and to Render the Proceedings for recovering possession thereof in certain cases, less
difcult and expensive, which adopted the language of the Real Property Limitations Act. See
An Act to Amend the Law Respecting Real Property, and to Render the Proceedings for Recovering
Possession thereof in Certain Cases, Less Difcult and Expensive (UK), 1834, 4 Will IV, c 1; Real
Property Limitations Act, 1833 (UK), 3 & 4 Will IV, c 27.
66. Lubetsky, supra note 5.
67. See e.g. Keil v 762098 Ontario (1992), 91 DLR (4th) 752 (Ont CA).
68. Lubetsky, supra, note 5 at 516.
69. Ibid at 537.
70. See Teis, supra note 2. Mutual mistake between the parties relates to who owns the land. See
also Bradford, supra note 2. Unilateral mistake on the part of the squatter or a good faith
belief in ownership is discussed in Bradford.
71. See Galati v Tassone, [1986] OJ No 698 (HC) [Galati].
72. Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 520-21.
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apathy, then they should be treated as having discontinued possession.73 which
renders it unnecessary to prove that they have been dispossessed or excluded
from possession. In such circumstances, the inconsistent use test is inapplicable,
and the claimant should succeed once they prove possession and animus
possidendi. However, as the remainder of this article demonstrates, there are other
fundamental objections to the test that cannot be overcome by simply confning
its application to a situation where the owner has future plans for the property.
A. JUDICIAL DISSATISFACTION WITH THE INCONSISTENT USE TEST

A striking feature of the case law that refers to the inconsistent use test is the hint
of judicial dissatisfaction with the test that threads its way through the judgments,
sometimes subtle but on other occasions more forceful. In Teis, Justice Laskin
commented as follows:74
Te test of inconsistent use focuses on the intention of the owner or paper title
holder, not on the intention of the claimant. It is a controversial element of an
adverse possession claim even when the claimant knowingly trespasses on the
owner’s land. … Taken at face value its application could unduly limit successful
adverse possession claims, especially when land is left vacant. [Te] paper title holder
could always claim an intention to develop or sell the land, or could maintain that
a person in possession cannot hold adversely to someone who does not care what is
happening on the land.

In Bradford Investments Ltd v Fama,75 Justice Cullity was more vociferous in
his condemnation of the rule. He noted that the rule in Leigh v Jack has been
completely discredited in England. However, despite the persuasive force of the
reasoning in Pye, he felt he was not entitled to follow recent English decisions
as he was bound by the trilogy of Court of Appeal for Ontario decisions.
He commented as follows:

73. Statutes of limitation typically state that a right of action to recover land is deemed to have
accrued once the person bringing the action has been dispossessed or discontinued his
possession. Te classic explanation of the distinction between the two terms was put forward
by Lord Justice Fry who stated that dispossession involves some form of ouster of the paper
owner by the squatter while in instances of discontinuance the owner is found to have given
up possession before the squatter enters on the land. See Rains v Buxton (1879), 14 Ch D
537 at 539. As was explained by Chief Justice Blackburne the term “discontinuance” is
used to mean an abandonment of possession. See McDonnell v McKinty (1847), 10 ILR
514 at 526 (Ir).
74. Teis, supra note 2 at para 24.
75. Bradford, supra note 2.
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Te introduction and development of the requirement of inconsistent use, and its
application in this jurisdiction has led the courts to draw a distinction between
knowing trespassers and other trespassers. To relate this to the terms of section 4 [of
the Real Property Limitations Act 1990] requires some intellectual efort. It means not
only that the time that a true owner’s right of re-entry will accrue will depend on the
result of an enquiry into the purposes for which the property was held at diferent
times within the statutory period, but also on the state of a claimant’s knowledge.
If the policy behind the statue is to provide certainty of land titles by protecting
the settled expectations of those who have enjoyed undisturbed possession of land
for what is considered to be a reasonable period, and to avoid litigation over titles
that will require an inquiry into events—let alone subjective states of mind—in the
distant past, the development could be considered regressive.76

Lubetsky is of the view that the inconsistent use test has reached a point of crisis.
He speculates that the Court of Appeal for Ontario may well review it when an
appropriate case comes before it.77 It is interesting to note that Supreme Court
of Canada recently obliquely referred to the possibility of such a review in Nelson
(City) v Mowatt:78
[T]he question properly before this Court is not whether the inconsistent use
requirement is necessary or desirable; we have received no submissions, for example,
on whether it should continue to apply to claims based on adverse possession in
Ontario.

Terefore, it is important to clarify whether the inconsistent use test should be
part of the law on adverse possession. Te remainder of Part II of this article
attempts to identify an underlying rationale for the inconsistent use test, and to
critically assess its shortcomings and the case for its retention.
B. A “RAISON D’ÊTRE” FOR THE TEST

Lubetsky points out that the rise and fall of the inconsistent use test in the course
of a single generation “begs the question of how it managed to catch on in the frst
place.”79 He speculates that Ontario’s adverse possession law was apparently missing
something important that this test seemed to address. He makes an interesting
argument that the “something” was the civil law principle of interversion and
the inconsistent use test acts as a functional equivalent to this civil law concept.
Interversion deals with the dilemma of a detainer, that is someone who uses
the land “with acknowledgement of a superior domain,” who changes intention
76.
77.
78.
79.

Ibid at para 100.
Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 525.
Nelson (City) v Mowatt, 2017 SCC 8 at para 21.
Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 525.
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vis-à-vis the property under detention and develops animus domini (an intention
to be the owner), a crucial component of acquisitive prescription. As the owner
has no way of knowing that the detainer has formed the requisite animus to start
the clock running on acquisitive prescription, the civil law requires the detainer
to manifest any change of intention with unequivocal facts and thereby give
notice to the true owner that their legal relationship has changed.
Lubetsky’s empirical analysis of the case law of Ontario leads him to the
conclusion that the inconsistent use test was typically applied in interversion-type
situations, and only those adverse possessors who demonstrated interversion
through unequivocal facts succeeded when the inconsistent use test was applied.
According to Lubetsky, most people who use the land “with acknowledgment of
a superior domain” can be characterized as a grantee (of an easement), a tenant/
licensee, or a co-owner.80 Tus, according to his theory, the inconsistent use
test will only be critical in resolving cases where the adverse possessor took
possession in such circumstances. One difculty with Lubetsky’s analysis is that
in a number of cases where he classifes the possessor as having taken possession
“with acknowledgment of a superior domain,”81 he fnds no evidence of any of
the scenarios he mentions.
Te adverse possessor may have been aware that they were not the owners of
the disputed plot but there was no evidence that they had commenced the use
of the land by virtue of a grant, lease, or a licence. Further difculties present
themselves, even if one considers his classifcation unimpeachable in this respect.
Lubetsky’s central argument seems to be that the common law has not specifcally
catered for the complications that such situations give rise to. It is submitted that
this is not the case. Regardless of whether or not one applies the inconsistent use
test, a possessor who originally commenced the use of the land by virtue of a right
of way, a lease, or a licence has always faced more difculties in proving adverse
possession. Where the claimant already had a right of way over the disputed land,
unless the acts of possession are unequivocal, they will have to prove an intention
to exclude the true owner which may be problematic in these circumstances.82
Where the claimant took possession pursuant to a lease or a licence, time will
only run against the owner when the permission or lease has expired.83 Tis
80. Ibid at 527.
81. See e.g. Fletcher, supra note 56; Elliot v Woodstock Agricultural Society, [2007] OJ No 3064
(Sup Ct); Marotta v Creative Investments Ltd, [2008] OJ No 1399 (Sup Ct).
82. See e.g. Littledale v Liverpool College, [1900] 1 Ch 19 (CA); George Wimpey & Co Ltd v Sohn,
[1967] Ch 487 (CA).
83. See Bellew v Bellew, [1982] IR 447 (Ir).
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moment may be difcult to pinpoint and the legislature has, on occasion, found
it necessary to clarify when a right of action is deemed to accrue.84
In England, adverse possession by a co-owner against his fellow co-owners is
prohibited by legislation.85 In the United States, the co-owner out of possession
must have notice of a repudiation of the co-ownership agreement before time can
run in favour of the co-owner in possession.86 Te common law is not missing a
concept to deal with these scenarios. Te judiciary and the legislature have taken
pains to deal with the complications which they present. I would argue that the
emergence of the inconsistent use test and its exceptions may be explained in a
less complicated manner by looking at what the judiciary have said.
As this test makes it more difcult for a claimant to succeed, in formulating
the exceptions to the rule and implying fctitious intentions, the judiciary has,
on occasion, been forced into a discussion of who should beneft from the
law on adverse possession and in what circumstances. Tis unusual feature of
Ontario case law contrasts sharply with the case law in England and Ireland
which, for the most part, demonstrates a concerted efort on the part of the
judiciary to apply the law in an objective fashion regardless of the merits or
demerits of the possessor or the owner. Te application of the inconsistent use
test is clearly motivated by a judicial desire to make it more difcult for deliberate
(bad faith) squatters to succeed against a responsible owner. Terefore, as one
would expect, it has evolved in a manner that denies its additional protection
to certain owners: for example, those who have mistaken the position of their
boundary,87 or acquiesced in an enclosure by a neighbour who believed they were
the owner.88 Also, in some cases, the courts have refused to apply the test where
the owner has efectively abandoned the land.89 While a plausible rationale exists
for the inconsistent use test, the judicial gymnastics apparent from Lubetsky’s
overview of the case law associated with it, reveal signifcant pitfalls with its
84. Te Statute of Limitations Act, 1957 provides that, in the case of a periodic tenancy with no
written lease, the tenancy is determined on the expiration of the frst period when no rent
is paid. Additionally, the right of action accrues at that point. See Statute of Limitations Act,
1957 (NI), s 17(2).
85. Limitation Act 1980 (UK), schedule 1, para 9. In Ireland, it is easier for a co-owner to
acquire title by adverse possession against another co-owner, but this position may have been
necessary historically to allow the ownership of farms to be updated following a death on
title. For discussion, see text accompanying footnote 134 below.
86. See Louis S Muldrow, “Te Adverseness of Possession to Fractional Interests” (1957) 9
Baylor L Rev 168.
87. See Beaudoin, supra note 63; Teis, supra note 2.
88. See Bradford, supra note 2.
89. See Galati, supra note 71.
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application. As mentioned earlier, certain difculties could be resolved by simply
confning the test’s application to a situation where the owner has future plans
for the property. It is worth considering, therefore, the case for embracing such
a re-engineered test.
C. THE CASE BY KATZ FOR AN INCONSISTENT USE MODEL OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION

In a 2010 article,90 Katz claims that the inconsistent use test has been wrongly
maligned. She argues that the inconsistent use model of adverse possession
recognizes the authority of the owner to set an agenda for the land and to
remain the owner without maintaining possession, but allows for a vacancy in
ownership to be flled where the owner is no longer exercising their authority and
the land has become agenda-less. Katz draws an analogy between the position
of the successful adverse possessor and a government that has taken over as
a result of a bloodless coup d’état. Katz maintains that this model of adverse
possession solves the problems of agenda-less objects just as the recognition of the
existing government (whatever its origins) solves the problem of stateless people.
Katz also maintains that this model of adverse possession permits the radical
transformation of squatters into owners without collapsing into a moral paradox
where the law appears to reward the theft of land.91 She notes that American
commentators have become increasingly dubious of the role played by adverse
possession in resolving certain utilitarian issues and concerned with the morality
of the transformation of the deliberate squatter into a land owner. Consequently,
she claims that judicial practices have been limiting the extent to which bad faith
squatters can succeed under the doctrine. She states that English commentators
have managed to sidestep the moral incoherence of the doctrine by relying on an
overly procedural model of adverse possession. Tis approach relies heavily on the
doctrine of relativity of title that recognizes the right to possess for both the owner
and the possessor and emphasizes that once the owner’s title is extinguished, the
squatter’s right to possession becomes unassailable. Katz criticizes this approach
as relying on an unsatisfactorily weak conception of ownership.92Although Katz
assumes ambivalence on the part of English jurists in relation to the morality of
the doctrine, certain judges have been quite vociferous in their criticism of the

90. See Katz, supra note 9.
91. Ibid at 60-63.
92. Ibid at 52-60.
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law that preceded the 2002 reforms.93 It is also important to note that a very clear
moral stance was adopted by the Law Commission of England and Wales in the
proposals that formed the basis for these changes.94 As mentioned, Fox and Cobb
accused the Commission of “moral essentialism” in its views that the owner who
lost title was blameless and that urban squatters were undeserving of the benefts
conferred by the old regime.95
Katz’s preferred model of adverse possession is as attractive as she presents
it. However, as she herself acknowledges, the inconsistent use model of adverse
possession has not been perfectly articulated in any jurisdiction.96 Te judicial
quagmire of approaches that the test generated in Ontario is illustrative of the
practical difculties that it presents. Legislative or judicial clarifcation that the
test shall only apply where the owner has a future agenda for the property would
not eliminate these difculties, as the presence or absence of such an agenda may
not be easy to establish in practice. As has been pointed out by the judiciary,
an owner could always claim an intention to develop or sell the property in the
future.97 Trying to establish subjective intention is always difcult and the test
does not tell us how specifc the owner’s purpose or future plans have to be. For
example, it is unclear how the test should be applied if the owner had a number
of alternative purposes or plans for the land and the squatter’s current use was
compatible with one or some of them but not with others. Also, the test would
not protect the owner who has yet to decide on what they will do with the land
or where the original plans of the owner or their predecessor in title have been
forgotten or are unclear.98
Also, assessing the inconsistency of the squatter’s acts of possession may not
be as straightforward as Katz suggests. For example, she states that an owner
with development plans requires the land to remain vacant until they are ready
to develop and, therefore, an adverse possessor who occupies the land interferes
with such plans.99 In reality, developer-owners do not require the land to remain
vacant in the interim and Katz does not give a true sense of the difculties
93. JA Pye 2000, supra note 39 at 709-10, Neuberger J; JA Pye 2002, supra note 2 at paras 2, 73,
Lord Bingham and Lord Hope, respectively.
94. Law Com No 254, supra note 19 at para 10.19.
95. Cobb & Fox, supra note 30.
96. Katz, supra note 9 at 63.
97. See Teis, supra note 2 at para 24.
98. See Tracey Enterprises MacAdam Limited v Drury, [2006] IEHC 381 (Ir). Although evidence
was given that the disputed plot may have been acquired with the intention of extending
quarrying onto it, Justice Lafoy was not convinced of this.
99. Katz, supra note 9 at 69.
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facing an adverse possessor who occupies the land in such circumstances. Te
judiciary has noted it may be impossible for an adverse possessor to succeed
against such an owner.100 At the very least, the case law indicates that the erection
of some sort of permanent building would be required.101 Te speculator-owner
with a plan to sell the land when the time was right (typically when it becomes
rezoned for development purposes) is also in a strong position when the test is
applied. Katz, however, seems to draw quite an arbitrary distinction between
the speculator-owner and the owner who plans to develop the land themselves.
She states that the speculator-owner should be treated as having discontinued
possession by failing to exercise agenda-setting authority. A failure to set an agenda
for the land renders the inconsistent user test inapplicable.102 She seems to equate
a plan to sell the land with an intention to abandon it which is surely an extremely
harsh view to take of property speculation and again fails to refect the case law
where such owners benefted from the application of the inconsistent use test.103
According to Katz, the owner who does not realize they are the owner should
also be taken to have discontinued possession which means that the inconsistent
use test does not apply in cases of mutual mistake or unilateral mistake on the
part of the owner.104 However, she maintains that the test should still apply in
cases of unilateral mistake on the part of the squatter where the true owner is
aware of their rights and has an agenda for the property. She maintains that such
a squatter will fnd it next to impossible to satisfy the test, presumably because
only “knowing” squatters will be in a position to engage in acts which directly
challenge the authority of the owner. Katz states that this situation is problematic
only if we think that there ought to be some connection between the virtue of
the squatter and the reward of adverse possession. Instead, she maintains that it
is not on the merits of the use or the user that adverse possession is justifed, but
rather on the imperative in any property system to guard against vacancies in
the position of the owner.105 Although Katz does not comment on the situation,
presumably an owner who has acquiesced in a mistaken enclosure by the squatter

100.
101.
102.
103.

See Masidon, supra note 57 at 573-74.
See Skidmore v Parkin (2002), 5 RPR (4th) 53 at para 33 (Ont Sup Ct).
Katz, supra note 9 at 69-70.
See Masidon, supra note 57; see also Marotta v Creative Investments Ltd (2008), 69 RPR (4th)
44 (Ont Sup Ct).
104. Katz, supra note 9 at 70-71.
105. Ibid at 71. As shall be demonstrated below, the introduction of a qualifed veto system of
adverse possession achieves both objectives: restricting the operation of the doctrine to
appropriate and deserving cases and restoring abandoned land to the market.
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should be treated as having discontinued possession, rendering the inconsistent
use test inapplicable.
Katz makes a convincing case that the law on adverse possession should
respect the authority of the owner to set an agenda for the property and remain
the owner while not in possession. However, if more protection is needed for
the owner, it is clear that the application of the inconsistent use test or the rule
in Leigh v Jack is an inelegant and haphazard method of meeting such a need,
which creates unnecessary complications in the law on adverse possession.
A fundamental problem with Katz’s argument for the adoption of an inconsistent
use model of adverse possession is her implicit assumption that it is the best
model for protecting the authority of the owner.
Lubetsky’s article highlights that owners may sometimes need a clear warning
that possession is adverse,106 while Katz points to a desire to protect absent owners
from inadvertently losing title without acts that demonstrate a direct challenge
to their authority or agenda. Both seem to be concerned that an owner may not
realize what is happening on the ground. It is worth exploring the merits of the
qualifed veto system of adverse possession, recently introduced in England and
Wales, as a pragmatic alternative to the inconsistent use test. Te remainder of
this article explores the case for the introduction of such a system in Ireland,
a jurisdiction that has yet (as is the case in Ontario with the inconsistent use test)
to defnitively reject the rule in Leigh v Jack.

III. THE QUALIFIED VETO SYSTEM OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION
A. THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE

Before the Land Registration Act 2002, the same rules governed adverse possession
of unregistered land and land that had been registered in the Land Registry in
England and Wales.107 Any person claiming to have acquired title to a registered
estate by adverse possession could apply to be registered as proprietor of that
estate and the registrar, on being satisfed that adverse possession had been

106. Lubetsky, supra note 5.
107. Te Land Registration Act 1925 provided that the Limitation Acts shall apply to registered
land in the same manner and to the same extent as those Acts applied to unregistered land.
See Land Registration Act 1925 (UK), 15 & 16 Geo V, c 12, s 75(1).
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established, would register the applicant as the new owner.108 Te qualifed veto
system of adverse possession introduced by the 2002 Act only applies to land that
has been registered in the Land Registry.109
Under the 2002 Act, an adverse possessor who has been in adverse possession
of a registered estate in land for at least ten years110 is entitled to apply to be
registered as proprietor of that estate.111 Te Land Registry must serve the
registered proprietor of the estate, any charge and any superior registered estate
(if the estate is leasehold) with notice of the application112 and any person who
receives such a notice is entitled to veto the application.113 However, the adverse
possessor will be entitled to be registered as proprietor of the estate if there is no
response to the notices served,114 or if no action is taken to repossess the land
within two years of the rejection of the adverse possessor’s application.115
Terefore, the doctrine will continue to play an important role in restoring
abandoned land to the market. Also, in three exceptional situations where the
Commission felt that the balance of fairness lay with the adverse possessor,116
the applicant will be registered in spite of an objection by a notice recipient.
108. Ibid, s 75(2)-(3). Rights acquired or in the process of being acquired through adverse
possession amounted to “overriding interests” which would bind a proprietor on frst
registration or following a disposition of registered land even though they did not appear
on the register. See Land Registration Act 1925 (UK), 15 & 16 Geo V, c 12, s 70(1)(f ).
Subsequent legislation reduces slightly the overriding status of the rights of an adverse
possessor so that they will only bind a new owner if the adverse possessor was in actual
occupation and his or her occupation was apparent or known to the new owner. See Land
Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, s 11(4)(b)-(c); Land Registration Act 2002, supra note
18, schedule 3, para 2(c).
109. Te Act introduces a divergence between the law governing adverse possession of registered
and unregistered land which is discussed below. Te Law Commission argued that extending
the veto system to unregistered land could weaken the security of title to such land as
the doctrine of adverse possession plays an essential role in the investigation of such titles
by curing title defects and facilitating transactions in relation to such land. See UK, Law
Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution (Law
Com No 271) (Te Stationery Ofce, 2001) at para 14.2 [Law Com No 271].
110. Note that the limitation period for actions to recover unregistered land continues to be
twelve years. See Limitation Act 1980, s 15(1).
111. Land Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, schedule 6, para 1.
112. Ibid at para 2.
113. Ibid at para 3, 5. Te veto is exercisable by requiring that the application be dealt with under
para 5, which only allows the applicant to be registered if one of the three conditions set out
therein is met.
114. Ibid at para 4.
115. Ibid at paras 6-7.
116. Law Com No 271, supra note 109 at para 14.36.

368

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Te frst exception preserves the doctrine’s operation where the applicant can
prove an equity by estoppel and the circumstances are such that they ought to
be registered as the owner.117 In its discussion of this exception in the report that
preceded the enactment of the 2002 Act, the Law Commission gave an example
of a purchaser who went into possession of land pursuant to an oral contract for
sale that was unenforceable as it was not “in writing” as required by section 2 of
the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.118 Te second exception
permits reliance on the doctrine where the applicant is “for some other reason”
entitled to be registered as the owner of the estate119 (e.g., if the adverse possessor
had contracted to buy the land and paid the purchase price but the legal estate
was never transferred to them).120 Te third exception facilitates the registration
of an applicant who owns adjacent land and who reasonably believed for at least
ten years ending on the date of the application that the land, which is the subject
matter of the application, belonged to them.121
B. LESSONS FOR IRELAND

Te reforms to the doctrine introduced in England and Wales by the 2002
Act “received widespread (if not universal) support.”122 While property lawyers
have traditionally emphasized the justifcations for the doctrine, a radical
transformation in attitude towards it justifability appears to have taken place
in recent times.123 As mentioned, members of the judiciary have been critical of
117.
118.
119.
120.

Land Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, schedule 6, para 5(2).
See Law Com No 271, supra note 109 at para 14.42.
Land Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, schedule 6, para 5(3).
Te Law Commission provided these examples in its report. See Law Com No 271, supra
note 109 at para 14.43. For a discussion of the difculties that arise in treating informal
purchasers as adverse possessors and how these problems could be resolved, see Una
Woods, “Adverse Possession and Informal Purchasers” (2009) 60 N Ir Leg Q 305 [Woods,
“Informal Purchasers”].
121. Land Registration Act 2002, supra note 18, schedule 6, para 5(4). For a critical discussion
of this qualifcation to the veto system, see Una Woods, “Adverse Possession and Boundary
Disputes, Lessons for Ireland from Abroad” (2016) 8 Intl JL Built Env 56.
122. Roger J Smith, Property Law, 6th ed (Pearson, 2009) at 67. Te reforms to the English law
on adverse possession introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002 have been described
as efecting an “emasculation” of the doctrine insofar as it applies to registered land. See
Martin Dixon, “Te Reform of Property Law and the Land Registration Act 2002: A Risk
Assessment” [2003] Conveyancer & Property Law 136 at 150. Neil Cobb & Lorna Fox
expressed reservations in relation to the reforms. See Cobb & Fox, supra note 30.
123. See Cobb & Fox, supra note 30 at 237-38. Cobb point out that a slight majority (60 per
cent) of those who responded to the Law Commission’s consultation supported the proposed
reforms “in principle.”
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the doctrine, especially in its application to registered land. For example, in Pye,
Lord Bingham of Cornhill declared the outcome of the adverse possession claim
as “apparently unjust.”124 Gray and Gray note:125
Tis view mirrored a growing public perception that it had become “too easy for
squatters to acquire title.” A criticism which attracted added force where difculties
in the efective policing of vacant premises by cash-strapped local authorities could
easily lead to substantial losses for the public purse … . If property is indeed a
relationship of socially approved control over a valued resource, it had become quite
clear that in the Britain of the 21st century, adverse possession of land is a form of
control which is no longer socially approved.

Tompson states that the reforms “will undoubtedly make the law substantively
more satisfactory” and meet, to a considerable extent, the objections of those
who viewed the traditional regime as distasteful.126 It is interesting to note that
in a report published by the Law Commission of England and Wales on 24
July 2018,127 the Commission noted that responses to their consultation on how
the adverse possession scheme is operating under the Land Registration Act 2002
did not suggest that fundamental reform to the scheme was desirable. Instead,
the Commission made some recommendations to deal with certain procedural
or technical issues related to how the law operates.128 Recently, the decision in
Best v Curtis129 illustrates an additional procedural issue which may require to
be revisited. While certain commentary on this case focused on the fact that

124. JA Pye 2002, supra note 2.
125. Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed (Oxford University Press,
2009) at para 9.1.15.
126. Mark P Tompson, “Adverse Possession: Te Abolition of Heresies” [2002] Conveyancer
& Prop Law 480 at 492. Tompson strongly welcomes the reforms. See also Mark P
Tompson, Modern Land Law, 5th ed (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 271.
127. UK, Law Commission, Updating the Land Registration Act 2002 (Law Com No 380) (Te
Stationery Ofce, 2018) at para 17.4.
128. Ibid, ch 17.
129. Best v Curtis (administrator of the estate of Curtis), [2016] EWLandRA 2015-0130.
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the current law permitted a “criminal”130 to be registered pursuant to the 2002
Act, the decision in the Property Chamber hinged on the fact that Mr. Curtis,
as a personal representative, would only be entitled to object to the registration of
Mr. Best as proprietor if he had previously applied to the registrar to be registered
as a person entitled to be notifed of such applications. Robin Hickey notes that it
is arguable that specifc provisions ought to be made for personal representatives
to be notifed of adverse possession applications.131 It is submitted, however, that
a number of more substantive lessons can be learned from the English experience
by legislators in Ireland (or any jurisdiction, including Ontario, Canada)
considering the introduction of a similar system of adverse possession.
Te article written by Fox and Cobb highlights the value of empirical
research as a precursor to any law reform project. It is important to consider
how the law on adverse possession currently operates in practice: Who is afected
and who benefts from the law on adverse possession? Te Northern Ireland
Law Commission emphasized that it would be important to carry out “a much
more detailed analysis of the diferent considerations applicable to the various
scenarios involving adverse possession” before a qualifed veto system could even
be considered for Northern Ireland.132
Tis article demonstrates the prevalence of adverse possession between family
members and neighbours in Ireland and discusses the reasons why owners may
be vulnerable and in need of additional protection in such circumstances. Any
empirical research should also engage with the possible impact of reform. Fox and
130. In earlier judicial review proceedings, the Court of Appeal upheld an order that the Chief
Land Registrar had to proceed with Mr. Best’s application to be registered on the basis of
adverse possession, notwithstanding the fact that for at least part of the relevant period
he had been committing the ofence of trespass in a residential building pursuant to the
Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Ofenders Act 2012. See Legal Aid Sentencing and
Punishment of Ofenders Act 2012 (UK), s 144; R (on the application of Best) v Chief Land
Registrar, [2015] EWCA Civ 17. Robin Hickey, “Te Best Outcome: Te Application of
Schedule 6 and the Reinforcement of Adverse Possession policy under the Land Registration
Act 2002: Best v Curtis” [2017] Conveyancer & Prop Law 53 at 60. Hickey comments:
For now, it seems at least strange for the law on the one hand to recognise the potential for
adverse possessors to become registered proprietors and on the other to posit a criminal ofence
likely to catch anyone adversely possessing residential premises. … [W]e will need to address
again the relationship between these provisions [of the Land Registration Act 2002] and the
criminal ofence in LASPOA 2012, s 144.”

See also Mark West, “Adverse Possession, Illegality and Land Registration: Te Balancing of
Conficting Public Policies” [2015] Conveyancer & Prop Law 432.
131. Hickey, supra note 130 at 59.
132. Consultation Paper, supra note 27 at para 2.51.
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Cobb argued that the English reforms would negatively impact the urban squatter
making use of a forgotten property. I have argued elsewhere that urban squatting
is not commonplace in Ireland;133 the predominant impact of the introduction
of a qualifed veto system of adverse possession would be to preclude claims by
“sibling” adverse possessors who went into possession of property forming part
of an unadministered estate of a deceased parent. Te historical justifcation for
the operation of the doctrine in favour of the child in possession in Ireland was
to permit ownership of small farms to be updated at a time when will-making
was uncommon, emigration was widespread, and grants of representation were
rarely extracted when a farmer died intestate.134 As pointed out elsewhere, this
peculiarly agricultural justifcation is no longer relevant in modern Ireland135
and it must be questioned whether it is fair to allow the occupying sibling to
extinguish the rights of those out of possession.136 Although it is difcult to make
generalizations in this area, it could be argued that the moral entitlement of an
applicant who has entered or remained in possession of the family home or a
residential investment property following the death of a parent is not as strong as
that of a child who had been raised to take over a farm, and perhaps forgone an
education and adequate pay during the lifetime of the parent.
As I have already mentioned, it is also easy to imagine a situation where absent
members of the family were content to allow a sibling to continue to occupy
a property but failed to appreciate that their interests were in danger of being
extinguished by neglecting to formalize the arrangement. Adverse possession
is a crude mechanism to rely on to resolve the disputes that can arise between
benefciaries with an entitlement to land following a death on title. It results in
the automatic transfer of ownership to the possessor without any consideration
of the circumstances of the other benefciaries or their vulnerability to a claim
when a family member goes into possession. It is submitted that the benefciaries

133. See Woods, supra note 22, ch 4, part 2. Wylie is sceptical about this justifcation for the
doctrine based on the notion that it makes a contribution to social problems such as
homelessness. He notes: “As has become all too clear in recent times, homelessness is one of
the most complex and intractable problems facing modern society and it is surely naïve to
think that adverse possession is a solution to it.” See supra note 36 at 8.
134. See Andrew Lyall, Land Law in Ireland, 3rd ed (Round Hall, 2010) at 990; JCW Wylie,
Irish Land Law, 5th ed (Bloomsbury Professional, 2013) at para 23.42; RA Pearce, “Adverse
Possession by the Next-of-Kin of an Intestate” (1987) 5 Ir L Times 281; Ireland, Law Reform
Commission, Report on Reform and Modernisation of Land Law and Conveyancing Law (July
2005) at 331-32.
135. See Woods 2016, supra note 48.
136. Ibid.
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out of possession are in need of additional protection, and adequate alternative
remedies exist to protect a benefciary in possession with a moral claim.
Te doctrine of proprietary estoppel provides a much more stable basis for
the grant of a remedy in such circumstances137 and also allows the court more
fexibility in its response.138 If the child can prove an intention to create legal
relations, consideration, and part performance, it may also be possible to prove
that the deceased entered into a contract to leave a particular property to them
by will.139 It should be noted that a child also has the option of bringing an
application pursuant to section 117 of the Succession Act 1965, although such an
application must be brought within six months of the extraction of the grant and
is unavailable if the parent dies intestate.140 If the court is of the opinion that the
testator has failed in their moral duty to make proper provisions for the child in
accordance with their means, whether by will or otherwise, it may order that just
provisions be made for the child out of the estate. In assessing the extent of that
moral duty, the court will have regard to special circumstances, such as where
“a child is induced to believe that by … working on a farm, he may ultimately
become the owner of it, thereby causing him to shape his upbringing, training
and life accordingly.”141
C. THE ADVANTAGES OF A QUALIFIED VETO SYSTEM

Te veto system of adverse possession is an efective—if not fool proof—method
of enabling abandoned land to be brought back onto the market. It is submitted
137. See Smyth v Halpin, [1997] 2 ILRM 38 (Ir) (in response to his father’s assurance that the
family home would be his after his mother’s death and at his father’s suggestion, the son
built an extension to the home at his own expense. When his father left the home to one
of his daughters instead, the court ordered a conveyance of the house to the son pursuant
to the doctrine of proprietary estoppel). See also Torner v Major, [2009] UKHL 18 (the
court ordered the transfer of a farm into the name of the claimant who had worked on the
deceased’s farm for 30 years without pay in reliance on oblique assurances made by the
deceased that he would inherit it).
138. In some circumstances, conferring a right of residence or awarding compensation may be
more appropriate than an outright transfer of ownership. See Hillary Biehler, Equity and the
Law of Trusts in Ireland, 6th ed (Round Hall, 2016), ch 18.
139. See McCarron v McCarron, [1997] 2 ILRM 349 (Ir).
140. Te Law Reform Commission has recently recommended that section 117 of the Succession
Act 1965 should be extended to allow children to make an application where the parent
died intestate. See Ireland, Te Law Reform Commission, Report on Section 117 of the
Succession Act 1965: Aspects of Provision for Children (LRC 118-2017), para 3.54. See
Succession Act, 1965 (IR), s 117.
141. See McDonald v Norris, [2000] 1 ILRM 382 (Ir); C(X) v T(R) [2003] IEHC 6 (Ir);
MH v NM, [1983] ILRM 519 (Ir).
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that an owner cannot be assumed to have permanently relinquished any claim
to land just because they have failed to use the land or bring an action to recover
it during the limitation period, particularly in Ireland in light of the familial/
neighbourly context of the majority of adverse possession claims. Under a veto
system of adverse possession, the owner is warned of the adverse possession
application and the application will only proceed if the owner fails to exercise
their veto within a specifed period of time. Although this system will, in most
cases, efectively identify owners who intend to abandon the land, it is not perfect
in this respect. Obviously, if the owner cannot be located (because of a failure to
update their contact details on the Land Register), they will have been denied the
protection of the veto and, consequently, an assumption cannot be reached about
whether there was an intention to abandon the land.
A qualifed veto approach is a very fexible method of refning the doctrine
of adverse possession as the qualifcations to the veto can be fashioned to suit
the valuable functions performed by the doctrine in any particular jurisdiction.
Tree categories of “deserving” squatters are particularly noteworthy in the Irish
context on the basis of the merits of their claim and/or for utilitarian reasons: (1)
informal purchasers; (2) those who hold under a defective paper title; and (3)
good faith possessors of a boundary strip.142 A squatter in possession under an
informal or a defective title could be described as the “true” owner. Te informal
purchaser would, in any event, be entitled to regularize their position by seeking an
order for specifc performance of the contract for sale. A qualifcation to the veto
system of adverse possession for such possessors would ensure that the doctrine is
preserved as a pragmatic alternative remedy in certain circumstances.143 Although
other remedies may be available, adverse possession is also regularly relied on
to cure defects in title. Not only does this adverse possessor “deserve” to rely
on the doctrine to quiet their title, the preservation of the doctrine’s function
in this context is essential to the functioning of the unregistered conveyancing
system.144 Finally, it is arguable that an adverse possessor of a boundary strip who
reasonably believed that they owned the land in question may be regarded as
“deserving” on the basis of their strong psychological attachment to it. However,
it is submitted that the more convincing case for this qualifcation is based on
142. See Woods, supra note 22, chs 4, 6, 8-9.
143. A purchaser in possession must be able to prove that the licence granted by the vendor has
been terminated expressly or by implication (e.g. if the entire purchase price has been paid)
and that the limitation period has expired. For further discussion, see Woods, “Informal
Purchasers,” supra note 120.
144. See discussion below on this point.
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the extent to which it protects purchasers and facilitates conveyancing in an
environment where boundaries are typically non-conclusive.145 If Ireland is to
introduce a qualifed veto system of adverse possession, we should also, I submit,
retain our current “light touch” criminal response to peaceable squatting by
adverse possessors who care for the property.146 An overview of the Irish criminal
law in this area147 reveals that no criminal sanctions can be brought against the
adverse possessors who I have just identifed as “deserving” and who should
continue to beneft from the doctrine.
D. THE EXTENSION OF THE QUALIFIED VETO SYSTEM TO UNREGISTERED
LAND

It is important to point out that I am not arguing that the reforms to the
English law on adverse possession introduced by the Land Registration Act 2002
should be directly transplanted into Irish law. For example, I submit that it
would be preferable to extend the veto system beyond registered land to include
unregistered land. Te Law Commission of England and Wales argued in favour
of retaining the existing law in relation to unregistered land on the basis that
making it more difcult to acquire title by adverse possession of unregistered
land could weaken the security of title to such land.148 Te Law Commission
appears to have assumed that extending the veto system to unregistered land
could damage the unregistered conveyancing system. Te Law Commission
acknowledged that the existing law can produce harsh results but maintained that
they are counterbalanced, in the context of unregistered land, by the essential role
played by the doctrine in facilitating conveyancing.149 Te divergence between
adverse possession of registered and unregistered land introduced by the English
Land Registration Act 2002 is far from ideal and the reform of the doctrine need
not necessarily lead to two diferent systems of adverse possession. Te Northern
Ireland Law Commission has also expressed reservations about creating a situation
of having the doctrine of adverse possession operate diferently depending on
whether the land is registered or unregistered.150
I have argued that a qualifed veto system of adverse possession could be
extended to unregistered land in a manner that would not afect the functionality
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See generally Woods, “Te Undeserving and Deserving Squatter,” supra note 14.
See Woods, supra note 22, ch 4, Part 1.
Ibid.
Law Com No 271, supra note 109 at para 14.2.
Law Com No 254, supra note 19.
Consultation Paper, supra note 27 at para 2.53.
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of the unregistered conveyancing system and may even facilitate the extension of
the registration of title system. In the case of unregistered land, it is proposed that
the qualifed veto system would be administered by the Property Registration
Authority151 on an application for frst registration based on long possession
or frst registration of an unregistered title. Consequently, the reform would
become relevant in the lead up to or following a transaction for value, which
triggers the requirement for compulsory frst registration of title. In practice, this
reform would mean that a person claiming a title based on adverse possession
of unregistered land would be deprived of the ability to engage in a valuable
transaction in relation to such land unless eforts are made to identify and
protect the owner by allowing them to veto the adverse possession application.
However, a qualifcation to the veto system would operate in the context of
an application for frst registration of unregistered land based on an imperfect
title (or “colour of title,” a concept from the United States) coupled with twelve
years adverse possession. Te extension of the veto to unregistered land coupled
with this exception to cater to defective titles would represent a fundamental
distinction between the qualifed veto system of adverse possession that I propose
for Ireland, and the system introduced in England and Wales that applies only
to registered land and preserves the old law of adverse possession in relation to
unregistered land.152 Tis approach would allow owners of unregistered land to
beneft from the veto in the face of an adverse possession application,153 but also
ensures that the registration of title system can ultimately be extended to the
most uncertain of titles.154

IV. CONCLUSION
Lubetsky has pointed out that the doctrine of adverse possession and, consequently,
the inconsistent use test may die a natural death once the province completely

151. Te Property Registration Authority was established by through legislation to manage
the Land Registry and the Registry of Deeds. See Registration of Deeds and Title Act
2006 (NI), ss 9-10.
152. For further discussion, see Una Woods, “Adverse Possession, Unregistered Land and Title
Defects: A Fly in the Ointment of Irish Reform?” in Heather Conway & Robin Hickey, eds,
Modern Studies in Property Law, vol 9 (Hart, 2017) at 61.
153. It may sometimes be difcult to identify the owner. In such circumstances, reasonable eforts
would have to be made through the display of site notices and newspaper advertisements. For
further discussion, see ibid.
154. For further discussion, see ibid.
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implements the Torrens Registered Title System.155 Section 51 of the Land Titles
Act prohibits the acquisition of title by adverse possession in relation to land
that has been registered.156 Although 99.9 per cent of titles in Ontario are now
registered under the land title system, many of these titles were automatically
converted in recent years without a proper investigation of title.157 Terefore,
such titles were registered subject to qualifers, which specifcally preserve the
rights of adverse possessors that had accrued prior to conversion. Before the title
can be upgraded to absolute, the qualifer must be removed, and any adverse
claims resolved. Alternatively, the adverse possessor may apply for registration
on the basis of a pre-existing possessory title. As a result, I would submit that
many years will pass before the doctrine of adverse possession is rendered
redundant in Ontario.
Although a prohibition on adverse possession of registered land has been
introduced by the 1990 Act, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that
Ontario could be forced to reintroduce adverse possession in the future. It would
not be possible in an article of this length to consider in any detail whether adverse
possession should be re-introduced in Ontario in the context of registered land
or how a qualifed veto system of adverse possession could be adapted to suit the
needs of that particular jurisdiction. Ideally, this would require an investigation
into how the doctrine operates in practice. It is possible, however, to draw certain
tentative deductions based on the experience of other jurisdictions. Although
it has, on occasion, been argued that adverse possession is inconsistent with a
registered title system,158 in reality, there is no uniform consensus on how the
doctrine should operate within a registered title context.159
In addition, there is ample evidence to suggest that the approach taken by
a particular jurisdiction may evolve as circumstances demand. New Zealand,
and a number of Australian territories, which (like Ontario, Canada) operated a
prohibition system of adverse possession were forced to re-introduce the doctrine
to govern registered land to counteract marketability difculties that arose
due to a culture of informal transactions and a high incidence of abandoned
155. Lubetsky, supra note 5 at 508.
156. RSO 1990, c L5.
157. Tis took place as part of the POLARIS programme which involved the automation of all
records in relation to land transactions and ownership.
158. See Law Com No 254, supra note 19 at para 10.11. For a critique of this argument, see
Una Woods, “Te English Law on Adverse Possession: A Tale of Two Systems” (2009) 38
Common L World Rev 27 at 31-38.
159. See generally Malcolm McKenzie Park, Te Efect of Adverse Possession on Part of Registered
Title Land Parcel (PhD Tesis, University of Melbourne, 2003) [unpublished].
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land.160 Wylie has emphasized that the doctrine of adverse possession is equally
as important in resolving conveyancing problems (e.g., informal transactions
or boundary encroachments) in relation to registered land as it is in relation
to unregistered land.161 Where land has been abandoned, awarding title to
a resourceful squatter can be justifed as a pragmatic response to overarching
societal concerns.162 Te squatter can be described as the most deserving recipient
of the law’s bounty on the same basis that title is awarded to the frst possessor of
unowned property or a fnder who takes possession of a chattel found lying on the
ground.163 An alternative approach would be to award title to the State, as is the
case with the estate of a deceased who dies without next of kin.164 However, the
squatter is more likely to be aware that the land is abandoned and hence more
motivated than the State to bring the land back into use and ultimately back
onto the market.165
Te main purpose of this article is to highlight that a qualifed veto system
of adverse possession more efectively responds to the difculties that the
inconsistent use test appears to be attempting to resolve. Te veto system ensures
that the owner is warned about the danger of losing title, without reintroducing
old notions of ouster or artifcially straining concepts of possession and intention.
By allowing the owner to veto an adverse possession application, the owner’s
authority to set an agenda for the land and to remain the owner without
maintaining possession is respected. However, where the owner has abandoned
the land and consequently fails to exercise their veto, this approach permits the
vacancy in ownership to be flled.

160. Ibid, ch 6.
161. See Wylie, supra note 36 at 10.
162. Recently, a number of US academics have justifed the doctrine on the basis that it operates
in cases of imputed or constructive abandonment. See Christopher Meredith, “Imputed
Abandonment: A Fresh Perspective on Adverse Possession and a Defence of the Objective
Standard” (2010) 29 Miss CL Rev 257; Scott Shepard, “Adverse Possession, Private-Zoning
Waiver & Desuetude: Abandonment & Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests” (2011)
44 Mich JL Reform 557.
163. See Armorie v Delamirie (1722), 93 ER 664; Parker v British Airways Board, [1982] 1
All ER 834 (CA).
164. See Succession Act 1965 (IR), s 73.
165. If no squatter takes possession, in certain jurisdictions which levy property taxes, the
state may ultimately acquire the right to sell the property for non-payment of such taxes.
In Ireland, it is currently more likely that the bank would acquire this right due to a failure to
make repayments on an outstanding secured loan.
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It is submitted that adverse possession is not a “relic” or “an ailing concept,”166
but a valuable feature of the modern Irish property law landscape. However, reform
is overdue to address the doctrine’s inability to protect vulnerable owners from
inadvertently losing title, particularly where a family member or a neighbour has
taken possession. Tis article illustrates the positive impact that the introduction
of a qualifed veto system in Ireland could have. In addition to conferring
additional protection on such owners, a qualifed veto system allows the doctrine
of adverse possession to continue to perform certain valuable functions. Tis is
achieved through the formulation of exceptions or qualifcations that facilitate
applications by specifed categories of claimant in spite of an objection by the
owner. Tese qualifcations may be adapted to meet the particular needs of any
jurisdiction but, in Ireland, it is possible to envisage a continuing role for the
doctrine in regularizing informal or defective titles and resolving certain types of
boundary disputes.

166. See JCW Wylie, “Adverse Possession: An Ailing Concept?” (1965) 16 N Ir Leg Q 467 at 489;
Wylie, supra note 36.
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V. APPENDIX: IRISH CASE LAW
Case Name

Was the claim
successful?

Pre-existing
relationship

1

Martin v Kearney [1902] 36 ILTR 117

Yes

Family

2

Morteshed v Morteshed [1902] 36 ILTR 142

Yes

Family

3

Doyle v Foley [1903] 2 IR 95

Yes

Family

4

Smith v Savage [1906] 1IR 469

Yes

Family

5

Christie v Christie (1917) 1 IR 17

Yes

Family

6

Keelan v Garvey [1925] 1 IR 1

No

Family

7

In Re Loughlin [1942] 1 IR 15

No

Family

8

Murland and Smyth v Despard and Alton [1956]
IR 170

Yes

Family

9

Vaughan v Cottingham [1961] 1 IR 184

No

Family

10

Ruddy v Gannon [1965] IR 283

Yes

Family

11

Browne v Fahy (HC, 24 October 1975)

No

Neighbours

12

Perry v Woodfarm Holmes [1975] IR 104

Yes

Neighbours

13

Murphy v Murphy [1980] IR 183

Yes

Family

14

Bellew v Bellew [1982] IR 447

Yes

Family/
Contractual

15

Drohan v Drohan [1984] 1 IR 311

No

Family

16

Dundalk Urban District Council v Conway (HC,
15 December 1987)

No

Neighbours

17

Seamus Durack Manufacturing Ltd v Considine
[1987] IR 677

Yes

Neighbours

18

Cork Corporation v Lynch [1995] 2 ILRM 598

No

Neighbours

19

Doyle v O’Neill (HC, 13 January 1995)

No (except for
narrow strip)

Neighbours

20

Fanning v Jenkinson (HC, 2 July 1997)

No

Neighbours
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Case Name

Was the claim
successful?

Pre-existing
relationship

21

Gleeson v Feehan and Purcell [1997] 1 ILRM 522

Yes

Family

22

Grifn v Bleithin 1999] 2 ILRM 182

Yes

Contractual

23

Feehan v Leamy [2001] IEHC 23

No

Neighbours

24

Bula Ltd (in receivership) v Crowley [2003] 1 IR
396

No

Contractual

25

Fahy v Dillon [2005] 7 JIC 2913

No

Neighbours

26

Keelgrove Properties Ltd v Shelbourne Development
Ltd [2005] IEHC 238

No

Neighbours

27

Tracey v Drury [2006] IEHC 381

No

Neighbours

28

Dunne v Iarnrod Eireann [2007] IEHC 314

No

Neighbours

29

Moley v Fee [2007] IEHC 143

No

Contractual

30

Mahon v O’Reilly [2010] IEHC 103

Yes

Neighbours

31

Moore v Moore [2010] IEHC 462

No

Family

32

Scanlon v Larkin [2011] IEHC 549

No

Neighbours

33

Gunning v Sherry [2012] IEHC 88

No

Family

34

O’Hagan v Grogan [2012] IESC 8

Yes

Strangers

